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Abstract
In this paper the author presents some non-conventional thoughts on the com-
plexity of the Universe and the algorithmic reproducibility of the human brain,
essentially sparked off by the notion of algorithmic complexity. We must warn that
though they evoke suggestive scenarios, they are still quite speculative.
1 Introductory remarks
The algorithmic (program-size, or Kolmogorov) complexity of a binary string s
is defined as the size in bits of the smallest computer program able to generate
it:
H(s) ≡ min
U(p)=s
|p|
where p is a program string used by a universal computer U to produce the
sequence s (Chaitin [1,2]).
Let us now consider the following algorithm of size ⌊log2N⌋+ k + 1 (see also
the Appendix). It lists in order of their size all strings of length less than or
equal to N bits (there are 2N+1 − 2 of them 1 ), writing them one after the
other on a computer file (or on a sheet of paper). The output should look like
0 1 00 01 10 11 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111 ...
1 That is, we sum up the number of all possible strings of one bit (2), that of all
possible strings of two bits (22), and so on up to N bits:
N∑
i=1
2i = 2 + 22 + 23 + ...+ 2N = 2N+1 − 2.
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Let us assume also that N ≫ ⌊log2N⌋ + k + 1. Thus, since
2⌊log2 N⌋+k+2 − 2
2N+1 − 2
≪ 1,
where 2⌊log2 N⌋+k+2 − 2 is the total number of different program strings which
could be obtained with a number of bits less than or equal to ⌊log2N⌋+k+1,
then among all the produced strings there is surely at least one that is more
complex than our algorithm, i.e. it can’t be produced by any program of size
less than or equal to ⌊log2N⌋+k+1 bits, by definition of algorithmic complex-
ity. Suddenly a paradox appears: an algorithm of size equal to ⌊log2N⌋+k+1
bits is able to write a list of strings which contains at least one that is more
complex than ⌊log2N⌋ + k + 1 bits, namely than the algorithm itself.
It is even more striking to consider a similar but simpler algorithm (the same
as before but without the if condition, and thus having constant size, nearly
equal to k bits; more in the Appendix) which lists every natural number in
binary notation, endlessly. In this context, we have that every binary string, of
any length, is generated by this almost trivial algorithm. And, although every
single string could be extremely complex (for instance, like that coding the
collected works of Giacomo Leopardi) the whole, infinite set has a ridiculous
algorithmic complexity.
Think for a moment to a god less ‘complex’ than a small portion of what
it created! Obviously, we are not claiming that our Universe is tout court
identical to a computer algorithm; what we want to suggest is that the concept
of something simpler generating something incredibly more complex is not
completely weird and unfounded, where simplicity and complexity must be
intended in terms of algorithmic complexity.
Think for a while to the mocking and frustrating possibility that this applies
to our real world too. Mankind is searching for the ultimate meaning of things,
expecting to find it through a wider and more complex description than we
currently have. But, maybe, that assumption could be simply wrong, and the
ultimate reason, the origin of complex things might be in a simpler thing,
as it happens with our listing algorithm. Saying it in other words, complexity
might be simply a by-product and any wider and more complex description, far
from being a step toward the final explanation of things, might exist with no
finality, might be simply self-aimed. Maybe, Who/What created the Universe
is not Omniscient and Almighty like we suppose It should be, but, let us say,
It might be simpler than bacteria. Tegmark [4] also suggested the possibility
of a Universe with almost no information content if taken as a whole, and he
did it from the point of view of quantum mechanics, while El Naschie [3], using
the Newton non-dimensional gravity constant αG as a measure of complexity
for the Universe, found that the information dimension of the Universe is 128,
nearly equal to the inverse of the Sommerfeld electromagnetic fine structure
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constant measure at the electro-weak scale αew.
Besides, the property of being explainable to mankind might be distributed by
chance over the things of our world. Some strings/patterns are reproducible
by shorter (therefore simpler and more familiar) programs, and thus they are
‘explainable’, while others are not and they are perceived as random by us
(see, for example, the model of inductive inference by Solomonoff [5]; and the
notion of random string, Chaitin [1]). But there might be no design under the
distribution of what is explainable and what is not. Likewise, some strings
of our listing program are reproducible by shorter program, some other not,
that’s all!
A similar argument on the (un)explainability of the reality was proposed by
C. S. Calude in terms of lexicons (see Calude and Meyerstein [6] and references
therein). A lexicon is the infinite expansion of some real number (e.g. the
infinite binary expansion of 0s and 1s obtained through the tossing of a fair
coin) with the base-independent property of containing every finite string as
a sub-string, infinitely many times. Calude and Meyerstein [6] suggest that
the Universe might behave like a lexicon and that we maybe ‘live’ on a very
long finite sequence that is ordered, i.e. it may be explained through science,
at least partially. But, there is no guarantee that it is anywhere, anytime the
same; the order may suddenly switch to pure randomness in other portions of
the lexicon/Universe.
2 Probability and the brain
The probability that your brain, specifically its function of giving rise to your
mind, is reproducible by a finite algorithm (e.g. N-bit long) is arbitrarily
close to 0.
For the sake of thought experiment, let us try to provide some arguments in
favor of the above statement. Let us suppose that the processes of your brain
which give rise to your mind are exactly assimilable to and reproducible by
an algorithm of N bits. Thus, we are able to algorithmically reproduce your
brain (and thus its product, your mind) as a program running on an ‘hardware’
different from your body in such a way that it does not suffer from the main
limitation of the human body, namely its relatively short life. In this way, such
‘brain’ could in principle work for an unlimited time span.
Moreover, let us imagine that as a part of the program simulating your brain
there is a very simple (from the algorithmic point of view) and fast counter
able to enumerate (but not to store) all binary numbers of c bits (there are 2c
of them) in increasing lexicographical order.
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Now, the reproduced mind could think of a specific decimal number greater
than the size (in bits) of its own generating algorithm, say N+k, and make the
counter start counting in increasing order all possible binary numbers/strings
of N + k bits (there are 2N+k of them).
At its own will, the simulated mind can then stop the counter whenever it
wants and print the last enumerated number. The counter could be provided
with a sort of counting completeness indicator, which would give the per-
centage of the whole count reached till that moment. This can be of some
help to the simulated mind in choosing when to stop the counter (not too
early for instance, since the first binary strings are surely not very complex
algorithmically).
Remember that the printed number is a binary string of N + k bits, less than
2N+k in size, and it results to be somewhat blindly chosen by the simulated
mind. Therefore, with probability nearly equal to
1−
2N+1 − 2
2N+k
∼ 1− 21−k,
where 2N+1 − 2 is the total number of different strings/programs which could
be obtained with a number of bits less than or equal to N , the simulated
N -bit long algorithmic brain/mind would be able to generate a sequence of a
complexity greater than N bits.
For k ≫ 1, such probability becomes arbitrarily close to 1. To recap, within the
hypothesis that your brain (and thus its product, your mind) is reproducible by
an N -bit long algorithm, the probability that such algorithm would be able
to generate a string of a complexity greater than N bits, and thus leading
to a logical paradox according to the definition of algorithmic complexity, is
arbitrarily close to 1. Therefore, the probability that the hypothesis will be
violated is arbitrarily close to 1.
Of course, there is a number of possible critiques to the above argument. Some-
one may argue that for big values of N the described enumeration (involving
2N+k binary numbers of N +k bits) is not physically feasible (it would require
an incredibly huge amount of time), making our point physically unsound.
Others may argue that the above argument does not eliminate at all the pos-
sibility that our minds are ‘algorithmic’: we might be similar to machines,
behaving predictably like machines (and thus ‘choosing’, through the pro-
cedure described above, a string of consistent algorithmic complexity), but
simply and wrongly believing we are not.
But, even in such cases our argument should be of some interest: though
probably physically unfeasible, our point seems to be in principle logically and
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mathematically sound (after all, many trusted mathematical demonstrations
are physically unverifiable, for they involve the concept of infinity for instance)
and maybe it might be an example of a physical status (i.e. our brains/minds
actually like algorithms) for which we are able to provide a logically and
mathematically sound argument of the contrary.
3 Digression
Let us consider the following device. A mechanical tool reads a decimal number
N in input and tosses an idealized, fair coin N times. Whenever the result of
the toss is a head, such device prints a 1 on a long tape, otherwise it prints
a 0. One might think that the algorithmic size of this device is proportional
to log2N (the size of the binary expansion of the decimal number N), and
therefore that it could be able to generate a sequence of a complexity greater
than log2N bits, with probability arbitrarily close to 1.
In that case, however, the algorithmic size of the device is comparable to the
complexity of the entire physical process, of all the physical laws (plus all
the relevant initial conditions) which make the toss to result each time in a
head rather than a tail, or vice versa. Hence, this device is not an algorithm
embedded in an electronic computer; rather, it operates under the influences
of the physical world. Maybe the same argument might apply to human mind
too: the peculiarity of the brain, in giving rise to mind and consciousness,
might partly originate from its complex and continuous physical interaction
with the surrounding physical world.
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Appendix
A possible (FORTRAN-like) computer code for our listing algorithm:
program list
N = Number of Bits (decimal number)
s = 0
1 write(*,*) bin(s)
if(#Bit(bin(s)).eq.N) goto 2
s = s+1
goto 1
2 stop
end
The size of this algorithm is a constant k (which results from the coding of its
instructions different from the decimal number N) plus the number of bits of
the binary coding of N , that is ⌊log2N⌋ + 1 (where ⌊x⌋ is the floor function
of x).
A simpler, yet more powerful, listing algorithm would be the following:
program list2
s = 0
1 write(*,*) bin(s)
s = s+1
goto 1
end
Its size is nearly equal to k but it is able to list an infinite number of binary
strings.
6
References
[1] Chaitin, G.J. Randomness and mathematical proof. Scientific American 232
(May 1975), 47-52.
[2] Chaitin, G.J. Algorithmic Information Theory. Cambridge, UK. Cambridge
University Press, 1987.
[3] El Naschie, M.S. The Concepts of E Infinity: An elementary introduction to
the Cantorian-fractal theory of quantum physics. Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
22 (2004), 495-511.
[4] Tegmark, M. Does the Universe in fact contain almost no information?
Foundation of Physics Letters 9-1 (1996), 25-42.
[5] Solomonoff, R.J. A formal theory of inductive inference, Part 1 and Part 2.
Inform. and Control 7 (1964), 1-22 and 224-254.
[6] Calude, C.S., Meyerstein, F.W. (1999). Is the Universe Lawful? Chaos, Solitons
& Fractals 10-6 (1999), 1075-1084.
7
